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Jamming the Law: Improvisational Theatre
and the ‘Spontaneity’ of Judgment
Sara Ramshaw1
Modern ‘nonscripted ’ theatre (NST) 2 clearly owes much to
improvisation. Perhaps less obviously, and more surprisingly, so too
does modern law.3 In this article I will contend that, despite all the
rules of evidence and procedure, statutes and legal precedents4 that
fundamentally govern the decisions and actions of a judge, it is only
through ‘spontaneity’5 that judgment can take place. This claim may
appear strange to those well-versed in the common law tradition6
which proceeds on the basis of past legal decisions, or reason where no
precedent exists.7 NST, on the other hand, is assumed to rely heavily
on the unprecedented and unreasoned. Therefore, when the public
watches a NST production, it places its faith in the belief that what is
being observed is entirely new and is being produced ‘on the spur of
the moment’.8
The dominant understanding of the common law tradition is
complicated by the fact that no two cases appearing before a court
for judgment can be exactly the same. There will always be some
distinction or dissimilarity; no two actions take place at the exact
same time, with the exact same parties and the exact same factual
situations. This distinction forms the basis of the adversary system9 in
which two opposing sides struggle to convince a judge or jury that her
or his interpretation of the case law, statute or regulation is the most
persuasive and should be accepted as ‘the truth’. Cases that are strikingly
Law Text Culture Vol 14 20100000
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similar to previous decisions rarely make it before a judge because, if it
is impossible to contradict or distinguish a past precedent, the outcome
will basically be known or guaranteed in advance and settlement out
of court, to save on the enormous expense of adjudication, would most
likely be suggested and encouraged. Thus, each judicial application of
existing rules or past precedents to new facts creates, in fact, a new and
improvised law. Novelty and creativity, however, must be subordinated
to tradition and precedent in order for law to remain legitimate and
commanding in contemporary society. Law, in other words, cannot be
seen to be produced ‘on the spur of the moment’. To be just, it must
apply fairly and equally and be known by all in advance (Pue 2000: 17).

While not disputing the importance of fairness and equality
in relation to law, this article calls for increased recognition of the
improvised creativity that is at the heart of legal reasoning. It matters
not whether the case to be decided is criminal,10 civil,11 procedural,12
substantive,13 decided from the bench,14 communicated through written
reasons — in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada or elsewhere
in the common law world15 — or decided by a panel of judges, at the
trial or the appellate level.16 It is the very nature of legal judgment, the
making of a decision, that elicits a negotiation between the singularity
of a particular case and the pre-existing rules or laws — be it case law,
statute law, laws of evidence and procedure — to which it must adhere
or follow. This process of negotiation is also one of translation: the
judgment or decision must present the novel and new as comprehensible
in light of current modes of legal thinking and understanding. Thus,
the ‘spontaneity’ of judgment is not so much about temporality as it
is about translation and negotiation between the novel (singular) and
the pre-existent (general), the individual (case) and the collective (law).
To better understand the ‘spontaneous’ elements of judgment,
improvisation is theorised here through NST, which dispels the myth
that creativity in improvisation is the result of an unconscious mind or
lone genius. Instead, improvisation exists only in relation to a collective
or community, to pre-existing rules or protocols, to the actions or words
of audience members or fellow actors on stage. In this article, the judge
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takes on the role of ‘nonscripted actor’ in the theatre of the courtroom
drama. While the storytelling in which the judge engages is not,
strictly-speaking, extempore, the act of judgment entails improvising
on past precedent to ensure that the singularity and uniqueness of each
case is made comprehensible through the more generalised law already
in existence. ‘Spontaneity’ in legal judgment, borrowing from NST
and critical studies in improvisation, calls for a far more nuanced and
complex conceptualisation of improvisation than simply extempore
or spur of the moment action or decision. The freedom of the judge
to decide is neither limitless nor completely constrained. Judgment
involves a negotiation between the singularity or otherness of the
individual case and the generality of pre-existing laws and precedents.
Legal improvisation must thus take into account the community within
which the judgment is being made and therefore entails ‘jamming’ or
‘creative group performance’ (Sawyer 2006), as will be explained below.
Conceived this way, the creativity of law is less about the individual
will of the judge (or judicial activism17) and more about what decision
is most just in the light of the circumstances and audience18 concerned.

Improvisation in Theatre
Although improvisation is not completely foreign to performance in
scripted theatre, it is more often used during the rehearsal process
to assist actors in developing their roles (Easty 1966: 109). It is a
preparatory technique, a tool in an actor’s training and a means for
discovering the subtext of a script. Improvisation ‘is not customarily
utilized in performance, except at times of crisis, when something
has gone wrong and an actor must “ad lib”’ (Fox 2003: 94). While no
performance, rehearsal or reading can be exactly the same every time
it is performed, which suggests the inclusion of some improvisational
elements, actors will generally aspire to consistency and predictability
in a performance and fear, perhaps even despise, surprise.19
NST, on the other hand, provides the necessary critical approach
to and analysis of ‘spontaneity’ and improvisation. It includes many
forms such as Theatre of the Oppressed (Boal 1985), Theatresports
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(Johnstone 1979; Weibe 2005: 42-3), Action Theatre (Zaporah 1995).
For the purposes of this article, the focus will be on Playback Theatre
(Fox 2003; Fox and Dauber 1999) as a form of improvisational theatre
in which audience members tell stories about particular events in their
lives and these stories are ‘played back’ or ‘recreated and given artistic
shape and coherence’ (IPTN20) by the actors on stage (Fox 2003: 3).
The decision to concentrate on this type of theatre stems, in part,
from its resemblance to the legal case:
In the Playback method, members of the community tell their stories
in the public sphere instead of just to trusted family, friends, or
neighbours in private spaces, and the actors decide how to perform
the story — which elements to emphasize or omit (Meer 2007: 107).

This mirrors the private stories told by litigants in the public
courtroom and the decisions of lawyers who dictate which elements of
the story will be highlighted or ignored. Of course, Playback does not
replicate the legal case precisely. In this form of improvised theatre,
actors must perform ‘spontaneously’, without discussion or negotiation,
and ‘work collectively to retell the story as authentically as possible’
(107). The storytelling, which takes place in the courtroom, is rarely
extempore or without discussion or negotiation, and it aims not towards
authenticity per se (although the story told is supposed to be authentic
and truthful), but towards persuasiveness and reason. As such, it is not
necessarily the spontaneous storytelling, but the negotiation, that takes
place in Playback Theatre between the singular and the general, the
individual and the collective21 that makes it an intriguing comparator
when examining the creativity of legal judgment. 22 Finally, much has
been written by the founders of Playback Theatre about its workings
and the meaning of ‘spontaneity’ in acting. This analysis is extremely
useful for dispelling many of the myths surrounding the process and
conceptualisation of improvisation and is another reason for the focus
on Playback Theatre in this article.

One further caveat is required before beginning the analysis. This
article is concerned with law, not with theatre. The ensuing discussion
of improvised theatre is thus being used to mount an argument about
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law, not illuminate the practice of Playback Theatre. As such, it relies
heavily upon the claims made about the practice and process of Playback
Theatre by its founders and participants. And while I have never actually
witnessed such a production, the point of this article is not to argue
that Playback Theatre actually achieves what its founders claim for
it, but that their rhetoric reveals, metaphorically at least, something
interesting about the practice of law. 23

Playback Theatre — Background
The original Playback Theatre Company began in New York City
(NYC) in 1975, with Jonathan Fox as its director. 24 Its aims were, and
remain, threefold: (1) to reach out to its audience; (2) to bring theatre
closer to everyday reality; and (3) to break away from the tradition of
scripted theatre. Playback is influenced by community ritual and theatre
and the oral tradition of storytelling and psychodrama, especially the
use of improvisation and the release of creative energy and notions
of inclusiveness, where every individual has a place in the collective
(IPTN). Although there is no script, there is a ‘rhythm and sequence’
to a Playback Theatre performance:
A Conductor is the host and facilitator of the process. After a period
of introduction and warming up, someone will volunteer to tell a
story. It could be a short moment, or about a longer event. They may
be past, present or future stories. They could be about a very special
time or about something that happens everyday. In the course of a
performance 3, 4 or 5, maybe more, people will come forward to tell
a story in this way. Towards the end of a performance, the Conductor
may invite reflections on the process, and the team will create some
sort of closure appropriate for the event (IPTN).

The person telling the story is called the ‘Teller’. She or he leaves the
audience area and sits in the Teller’s chair. The story is told from there,
with the support of the ‘Conductor’. During the ‘Interview’ stage, the
Teller chooses actors to play roles in the story. As each actor is chosen,
she or he stands. The story begins and the Conductor says, ‘Let’s watch’.
This is the cue for the performers to begin enacting the story. Music
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may provide atmosphere and mood; boxes or chairs may be used to
define the space. During the performance, the actors ‘spontaneously
improvise a re-enactment of the story, and this may happen in different
artistic forms, aiming to present and capture the essence and heart of
the story’. The performance ends with the actors looking to the Teller
in an act of acknowledgment. During the ‘Closure’ stage, the Teller
has an opportunity to say more if they are so moved. Sometimes the
Teller is offered the chance to correct or transform the scene; the actors
replay it accordingly. The Conductor then thanks the Teller and she or
he returns to her or his seat. Another person is invited to tell the next
story, and so on (IPTN).

‘Spontaneity’ in Playback Theatre
‘Spontaneity’ plays a large role in Playback Theatre. According to
its creators, the practice of Playback Theatre is characterised by ‘[a]
uthenticity in the spontaneous moment’ (IPTN); it ‘challenges the
actors to listen, allow intuition and inspiration to arise, trust and
support each other, and to call upon their innate personal wisdom
and experience’ (IPTN). In addition to the acting and theatre skills,
personal awareness and self-development are keys to becoming a
talented Playback actor.
For its creator, Jonathan Fox, the success of a Playback Theatre
performance depends on ‘spontaneity’, which, for him, ‘is deeply
associated with action and a definite type of nonthinking’ (Fox 2003:
79, emphasis in original). Fox describes ‘spontaneity’ in relation to four
key features. The first is vitality:
Persons who do not hold back and are able to express themselves
directly convey a sense of aliveness. They move, they laugh, they
surprise, they shine. They convey an appealing warmth or magnetism
that is evident from the instant they enter the hall (80, emphasis in
original).

The second is appropriateness:
The idea of spontaneity as heedless impulse belittles the potential
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of the concept. … The actor with spontaneity … will always have a
measure of the situation, will be adequate in any role, and will know
when to blend in and when to stand out (80).

The third is intuitiveness:
The spontaneous nonscripted actor, unrestricted by a playwright’s lines,
can say whatever comes, often producing word and action as stunning
à propos as it is unexpected. Thus an actor with a trained imagination
and with full access to his or her senses has available a wide range of
expressive possibilities (80).

Finally, the actors must display a readiness for change:
In a nontextual situation, the unexpected is a way of life. To deal with
irregularity in a creative way requires an ability to accept each moment
as it comes and respond dynamically. Most important of all is to accept
the idea of living constantly with the unforeseen (80-1).

Fox’s signs of ‘spontaneity’, outlined above, resonate with the
work of other critical theorists of improvisation such as Fischlin and
Heble (2003, 2004), who view improvisation as a complex ‘social
practice’ (Fischlin and Heble 2004: 14), a ‘provocation to avoid stasis’
(13) and a ‘resistance to orthodoxies’ (11). Where Fox is less rigorous
and convincing, though, is in his analysis of those factors that resist
the ‘spontaneous’. According to Fox, such ‘blocks’ to ‘spontaneity’
are: (1) knowledge ‘… the desire to know often acts as an impediment
to spontaneity’ (Fox 2003: 83, emphasis in original); (2) planning
‘The unspontaneous actor will often want to decide ahead of time
exactly what will happen’ (83); and (3) analysis ‘The analytical actor
will interpret the scene instead of entering into it, and the portrayal
will have a heady, undynamic feel’ (83-4). Fox’s advice for attaining
‘spontaneity’, then, is: ‘Don’t ask questions, don’t plan, don’t analyse’ (84,
emphasis added).

One of the primary aims of critical studies in improvisation 25 has
been to challenge the conception of improvisation as requiring ‘no
prior thought’ (Fischlin and Heble 2004: 23), as adhering to ‘neither
convention nor protocol’ (23), and as being primarily concerned with
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the ‘unblocking of obstacles that impede access to forms of individual
self-expression’ (23). Fox too admits that even NST such as Playback
is ‘wary of fully embracing the idea of spontaneity’ where it is viewed
solely as ‘unplanned action’ (Fox 2003: 85). ‘Spontaneity’, he argues,
is ‘made possible by adherence to the ritual ’ (Fox and Dauber 1999:
7, emphasis added): ‘The sameness of the ritual allows, paradoxically,
for tellers to take risks, often surprising themselves by the story that
emerges’ (Fox 2003: 263). The ritual creates a framework for the process
which enables the unpredictable to occur:
When the ritual is held well by the conductor and the performers,
there is a subconscious sense of safety amongst the audience. And in
this atmosphere, the most profound as well as the most mundane of
personal stories will feel welcomed and honoured (IPTN).

Although there is no written script to guide the action, Playback
Theatre is not without its conceptual ‘frames’. For Fox, the ‘frame’
refers to ‘a category of understanding, a principal theme of [the]
story-of-the moment, an appreciation of which will guide decisions
for action’ (Fox 2003: 91-2). Fox explains the ‘frames’ in relation to
certain dichotomies which, for him, are unsettled by the ‘spontaneous’.
Of particular relevance to this discussion is the dichotomy between
structure and freedom. Improvisation is often conceived as complete
freedom in opposition to the structure associated with, for example,
scripted theatre. To quote Fox:
In considering ‘improvisation,’ there is a definite connotation of second
best associated with the word, according to which one is distinctly at
a disadvantage when one has to improvise, be it a poem or a solution
(Fox 2003: 94, emphasis in original).

The extemporaneous play is both aesthetically and expressively
devalued: ‘The plot won’t add up, there will be loose ends, the
characterizations will be thin. Nor is it likely to look very good — no
chance here for breathtaking costumes, backdrops, or lighting effects’
(95). Any experience of the unknown, with which improvisation
confronts us, is thereby discouraged in contemporary theatre and
culture (95). And yet it is the unknown and the possibility of failure,
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which makes success possible in the world of improvisation: ‘Failure
is not the poison but the spice of oral composition’ (96).

What Fox, and other critical theorists of improvisation, appreciate
is that ‘even for improvisation, a certain level of structure is necessary’
(96). NST groups practice improvisation within ‘structured contexts’
(96): ‘Teachers of creative drama develop a method for their sessions.
… The comic-satire actors perform structured theatre “games,” which,
if not “rehearsed,” are intensively practiced’ (96-7). Therefore, Playback
Theatre is itself intensely structured around a framework consisting of
an opening, a closing and scenes in between involving the interview,
the setting-up, the enactment, and the acknowledgment (97).
A further distinguishing characteristic of improvisation is that the
framework for action is set up so that it can be superseded:
At that instant, a metacommunicative frame surrounding both original
and new will encapsulate both and give the occasion meaning. The
exciting part is that this ‘superframe’ of understanding is never known
beforehand. There is an atmosphere of uncertainty and unpredictability
which Turner describes with the word ‘liminal’ (Fox 2003: 98).

‘Spontaneity’, then, can be thought of as a ‘creative response to a
liminal condition’ (99). Once again, as Fox explains:
What is most important, then, in discussing structure and freedom in
the theatre is not that there must be structure, nor that there must be
freedom, but that there be established a condition of liminality between
the two states. Thus, seeing a play, with all its structure, can be a liminal
experience, while seeing a happening, which is “spontaneous,” can be
deadening. Any combination is possible so long as it falls within a
spectrum at the extremes of which are the anomie of excessive freedom
and the dispirited productivity of rigid structure (99).

If liminality and risk are feared due to a lack of confidence, the
NST performance will also be lacking. No matter how experienced
or talented an actor may be, without the ‘courage to consciously seek
out a liminal moment’ (101), she or he will be unable to confront ‘the
heart of darkness in a story’ (101). Therefore, the Playback performer
will walk ‘steadfastly towards liminality’ (101) in order to ‘go all the
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way with a story’ (101) and, ‘[i]n the presence of such full spontaneity,
audience attention is intense’ (101).

‘Spontaneity’ thereby requires being both in the moment, animallike, with senses open to information from the environment, and
standing outside the moment to make sense of what is occurring.
Only then can action be taken and this action in turn creates a new
environmental condition. ‘Spontaneity’, as Fox explains, is thus ‘the
ability to maintain a free-flowing constantly self-adjusting cycle of
sensory input, evaluation, and action’ (101), not simply ‘quickness of
action’ (101, emphasis in original). It is envisaged as ‘choice of action’
(101, emphasis in original).

This conceptualisation of ‘spontaneity’ as choice, as opposed to
unthinking or unplanned action, is important to the discussion on law
and justice below. Improvisation may involve play or playfulness, but it
also calls upon our highest intelligence (102), ‘where the nonrational
and rational are comprehended in an understanding which surpasses
the understanding of each’ (90). ‘Spontaneity’ entails both experiencing
and understanding the moment; it brings the audience and actors
together in a shared experience of ‘involvement and purpose’ (91). The
‘spontaneous’ integrates and provides a ‘sense of culture as connecting’
(91, emphasis in original). Improvisation is therefore not simply or
solely an expression of the individual unconscious but, as Bateson says,
‘it is concerned with the relation between the levels of communication’
(quoted at 91, emphasis in original).

Justice as ‘Spontaneity’
Much has been written on the theatrical aspects of law or the
relationship between law and theatre or law as performance (see, for
example, Rogers 2008, Stone Peters 2008, Balkin and Levinson 1999,
Balkin 2003). Very little academic literature exists, however, on the
topic of law, justice and improvisation.26 Modern law, as reasoned and
rule-bound, is often viewed as antithetical to improvisation (Soules
2004: 270). Legal precedent, for example, encourages the view that
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judges should not spontaneously invent law and any judicial activism
should be controlled or reined-in. Nitta (2001) explains:
One of the most important values in our political system is that all
people should be subject to ‘rules of law and not merely the opinions
of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high office.’ The
doctrines of precedent and stare decisis support this value by: (1)
fostering impartiality by providing a neutral source of authority by
which judges must justify their decisions and (2) limiting the actual
impact that a single person has on shaping the law. Therefore, by
offering a framework in which judges must decide a case, precedent
minimizes the influence of personal bias or beliefs on judicial decisions
and consequently promotes the public’s faith in our system of justice
(Nitta 2001: 798-9, citations omitted).

Precedent thereby limits the scope of judicial power. It restricts the
role of a judge to determine the law in each case, ‘not according to his
[or her] own judgment, but according to the known laws’ (809). Nitta
argues that ‘[j]udicial power, therefore, does not allow a judge to invent
laws, but to determine only what the law is in accordance with laws
previously pronounced’ (809-10). Moreover, precedent is often viewed
as integral to justice; it ‘encourages the public to have faith that justice
will be done and consequently allows the public to trust their affairs
to the adjudication of the courts’ (Nitta 2001: 798).
Not only is judgment limited by precedent, courtroom decisions
must adhere to rules of evidence and procedure. In fact, on its face,
the common law seems to hold very little room for improvisation and
spontaneity. And yet, it is also the case that every judicial act is, in
some sense, improvised. As no two actions can be exactly the same,
judges ‘make new law’ (Dworkin 1986: 6) every time they are asked
to decide a case. These legal performances are unique events, ‘never
merely a rehearsal on a different stage’ (Davies 1996: 97-8). Law can
thus neither dispense with, nor be completely determined by, the device
of precedent (Deutscher 2005: 98). In the words of Rogers, ‘[w]hile
norms and legal precedents may be applied they must be re-read, recreated or re-constructed for each new set of circumstances’ (Rogers
2008: 431). The legal decision thus always contains the possibility of
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being ‘otherwise’ (Fitzpatrick 2001: 89). However, the improvised
aspects of law must be subordinated to the known, to legal precedent
and tradition, in order to endure as authoritative and commanding in
Western society.

Accepting the view offered above that ‘spontaneit y’ and
improvisation are far more complex than typically conceived —
‘improvisation is too good to leave to chance’ (Paul Simon, quoted in
Fischlin and Heble 2004: 31) — and acknowledging that judges do
improvise on the law when asked to decide a case, what does a critical
study of improvisation, such as that proposed by NST, add to our
discussion of law and justice?
For the late French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, law, to be just,
cannot be but improvised and ‘spontaneous’. In his article ‘Force of Law:
The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’, Derrida unpacks the ‘difficult
and unstable distinction between justice and law’ (Derrida 2002a: 250),
which he likens to the ‘problematic relation between the singular and
the general’ (Attridge 1992a: 181; see also Derrida 1992: 187). Justice
— ‘infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry,
heterogeneous and heterotropic’ (Derrida 2002a: 250) — is positioned
as singularity (248) in opposition to a more generalised law. Derrida
explains: ‘Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an
absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or
ought to guarantee absolutely’ (251). Justice, in other words, to be truly
just, can never be known in advance; to be completely faithful to the
singularity of the other, it must be spontaneous and improvised in nature.

Improvisation as the purely singular is, as noted above, an
impossibility, and justice can never be totally ‘spontaneous’ in nature.
Just as improvisational theatre requires a frame or ritual from which to
depart in order to be improvisation, justice can only be revealed through
law, through ‘a system of regulated and coded prescriptions’ (Derrida
2002a: 250, emphasis added), which is constituted solely in terms of
its ‘generality’ (245) and ‘universality’ (245). Justice, in other words, is
‘dependent on the determinate presence effected by the legal decision’
(Fitzpatrick 2005a: 4). As Derrida explains: ‘No justice is exercised, no
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justice is rendered, no justice becomes effective nor does it determine
itself in the form of law, without a decision’ (Derrida 2002a: 252).

Conversely, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, law needs
justice as singularity in order to remain legitimate and authoritative
in Western society. According to Peter Fitzpatrick, law ‘cannot be …
enduringly ordered and predictable’ (Fitzpatrick 2005a: 8). If it were,
‘there could be no call for decision, for determination, for law’ (9).
Instead, for law to endure, it requires a simultaneous ‘responsiveness’
(9), an ‘attunement and attentiveness to what is beyond’ (9). Law, argues
Fitzpatrick, must be able to ‘change and adapt to such other things as
“society”, or “history”’ (9; see also Fitzpatrick 2005b: 464). Moreover,
this responsiveness to the other of law is ‘essential for law’ (Fitzpatrick
2005a: 9, emphasis added).
If law needs justice and justice needs ‘spontaneity’ then law needs
improvisation to be just. Not a purely singular or extemporaneous
improvisation — for such is impossible. Instead, it is an improvisation
that requires law as much as the converse is true. To help explain, and by
definition, improvisation must ‘overflow, overlook, transgress, negate’
(Derrida 1989: 41) that from where it comes, be it a frame or ritual.
Improvisation, in other words, may be constituted by originality, but
its recognition as improvisation is wholly dependent on those laws and
codes it transgresses (Attridge 1992b: 310). Improvisation thus needs
to be with law to be improvised. Its originality, in other words, can only
be ‘display[ed]’ (Derrida 1989: 27) and brought into presence or made
present, through law, through that from which it departs.
Conversely, law needs improvisation to remain properly
commanding in Western society. As revealed by Derrida (2002a) in
the paper ‘Force of Law’:
To be just, the decision of the judge, for example, must not only follow
a rule of law or a general law [loi] but must also assume it, approve it,
confirm its value, by a reinstituting act of interpretation, as if, at the
limit, the law [loi] did not exist previously — as if the judge himself
invented it in each case. Each exercise of justice as law can be just
only if it is a ‘ fresh judgment’ (Derrida 2002a: 251, emphasis added).
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Such improvised elements in law ensure that it never becomes
completely or ‘perfectly stilled’ (Fitzpatrick 2005a: 9; Fitzpatrick 2003:
58). In its concern for otherness and the new, improvisation effectively
sustains the need for decision, sustains the need for law (Fitzpatrick
2005a: 9; Fitzpatrick 2003: 58). If law’s content was completely lacking
in improvisation, or was ‘perfectly stilled’ (Fitzpatrick 2005a: 9), ‘it
would cease to rule the situation that would inexorably change around
it’ (9). If judgment, in other words, was always known in advance, there
would be no need for decision, or for law.

The Art of Jamming: The Individual and the
Collective
Admittedly, not all improvisation is creative. However, if one takes the
position, à la Derrida above, that it is only through improvisational
creativity that the (im)possibility 27 of justice can be realised,
what remains is an unpacking of the cultural myths (surrounding
improvisation and creativity) that impede societal acceptance of the
image of judge as improviser. Some of these myths include the idea that
improvisational creativity ‘is a burst of inspiration from a lone genius;
that a person working alone is always more creative than a group;
and that social conventions and expectations always interfere with
creativity’ (Sawyer 2006: 259). What Sawyer’s work on ‘creative group
performance’ makes evident is that creative and just improvisation ‘is
fundamentally social and collaborative’ (257); ‘it involves preparation,
training, and hard work’ (257) and ‘the process is more important than
the product or the personality’ (257).
Creative group performance is often referred to as ‘jamming’ (3).
To use the term ‘jamming’ in relation to law may seem strange, not the
least because of its social history and meaning. The term was first used
by jazz musicians to indicate an ‘impromptu gathering of musicians
with the purpose of improvising together’ (3). It is often emphasised
that it was in jam sessions, such as those in New York City or elsewhere
in the US, that great improvising jazz musicians — Charlie Parker,
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for instance — honed the art of the improvised solo. The notion that
improvised creativity is a ‘solo art’ (Green 1966: 40) is critiqued by
musicians and actors alike. Improvisation is often portrayed as ‘merely
the expression of individual freedom’ (Stewart 2003: 96) or something
actors and musicians ‘do “off the top of their heads”’ (96). Creative group
performance, that is, improvisation, though, is a communal effort and
is judged in relation to the collective performance as a whole.

This is one of the paradoxes of improvised creativity. The improvising
performer ‘works with and against the group at the same time’ (Jones
1991: 48). It involves a ‘delicate balance’ being struck ‘between [a]
strong individual personality and the group’ (Ellison 1953: 189). The
US writer, Ralph Ellison, describes the jam session as ‘a marvel of social
organization’ (189). It is a ‘cruel contradiction’ (234), he writes, that
an improviser must ‘lose his [or her!] identity even as he finds it’ (234)
and ‘each solo flight, or improvisation, represents … a definition of his
identity: as an individual, as a member of the collectivity and as a link
in the chain of tradition’ (234). The creativity of any improviser then,
instead of being illimitably free and unconstrained, depends on the group
and the community within which he or she is improvising for meaning.
The term, jamming, typically connotes a positive experience. As R
K Sawyer (2006) explains:
… when a performance goes particularly well, the musicians might
say ‘we were really jamming tonight.’ In the last several decades,
the term has been widely used outside of jazz to describe any freeflowing creative group interaction. … For example, actress Valerie
Harper, who began her career at the Second City, Chicago’s legendary
improvisational theater, said ‘I’ve always found improvisation … to
be close to jazz musicians jamming — you’re really listening to each
other, really hearing’. … The American Heritage Dictionary (1982)
defined the jam session as both a type of jazz performance and also as
‘an impromptu or highly informal discussion.’ The Harvard Business
School professor John Kao referred to work teams as jamming when
they are effective and innovative (Sawyer 2006: 3, citations omitted).
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Jamming, however, also entails a violence, as expressed by the term
‘cutting contests’, in which musicians engaged during jam sessions as
a form of ‘musical duelling’ (Belgrad 1989: 180). ‘Cutting’ tested the
‘skill and creativity’ (180) of the individual musicians and it was in
these ‘cutting contests’ that ‘musicians established and maintained a
hierarchy of professional competence’ (DeVeaux 1997: 209).28
Marshall Soules (2004) writes on the violent contradiction of
jamming in relation to both acting and music:
The complex negotiation of identity within a performance context —
whether the art be music, acting, writing, or performance of self in
everyday life — pits individual freedoms against the constraints and
opportunities of society’ (Soules 2004: 268).

Each assertion of individuality is challenged by the collective and
requires much ‘commitment, courage, and risk-taking’ (268) by
the improvising performer. The violence or cruelty done to the
individual, however, is simultaneously marked by an ‘affirmation …
of … implacable necessity’ (Derrida 2001: 292; see also Soules 2004:
268). Violence, in other words, not only renders individual expression
expressible, but also ensures the possibility of this expression being
other than what it is. This ‘cruel contradiction’ (Soules 2004: 269),
which ‘threatens to erase the traces of identity’ (269), also ‘animates
improvisation’ (269) and enables it to thrive:
… both improvising musicians and actors must lose their identities even
as they find them, but they do so within a framework of productive
constraints — the protocols of improvisation. In a seeming paradox
that threatens to erase the traces of identity, improvisation thrives when
the performance of character is given latitude of expression within the
framework of the ensemble (Soules 2004: 269).

These protocols — the ‘“long established codes” determining
“precedence and precisely correct procedure”’ (270) — act as law. Thus,
while it ‘may at first seem antithetical to popular notions of improvised
creativity’ (270), improvisation can only exist in relation to these
‘voluntary constraints’ (270) and to law.
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The paradox that animates improvisation not only applies to
improvised theatre, but to scripted acting as well. Citing renowned
Russian actor and teacher, Michael Chekhov, Soules writes:
Every role offers an actor the opportunity to improvise, to collaborate
and truly co-create with the author and director. This suggestion, of
course, does not imply improvising new lines or substituting business
for that outlined by the director. On the contrary. The given lines and
the business are the firm bases upon which the actor must and can
develop his improvisations. How he speaks the lines and how he fulfills
the business are the open gates to a vast field of improvisation. The
‘hows’ of his lines and business are the ways in which he can express
himself freely (quoted at 269, emphasis in Soules).

The laws of ‘lines and business’ in scripted theatre may be more explicit,
but even performances as ‘radically improvisational’ (270) as Ornette
Coleman’s Free Jazz are not without some constraints. The protocols
or laws governing the music in this particular recording are outlined
in Martin William’s liner notes to the album:
Not only is the improvisation almost total, it is frequently collective,
involving all eight men at once. And there were no preconceptions as
to themes, chord patterns or chorus lengths. The guide for each soloist
was a brief ensemble part which introduces him and which gave him an
area of musical pitch (Williams 1998: 2-3, emphasis added).

Improvisation is accordingly ‘not typified by unrestrained freedom’
(Soules 2004: 271) and instead requires a constant mindfulness as to
how the individual improvisations are determining or influencing the
performance as a whole. Ornette Coleman explains this further in
relation to his Free Jazz recording:
The most important thing … was for us to play together, all at the
same time, without getting in each other’s way, and also have enough
room for each player to ad lib alone — and to follow this idea for the
duration of the album (quoted in Williams 1998: 3).

Improvisation in both music and theatre demands a ‘constant
negotiation between the freedoms accorded to the individual improviser
and those of the group as a whole’ (Stewart 2003: 93). It requires both
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‘individual responsibility for the sounds [or actions] produced and
collective responsibility for the overall performance’ (Prévost 2004:
358). Creative improvisation accordingly provides ‘the means towards
both individual self-fashioning and communal liberation’ (Gilroy 2000:
497, emphasis added).

‘Spontaneity’ in legal judgment similarly calls for a constant
negotiation between the freedom of the judge to take account of the
otherness or singularity of the case and the existing laws or rules, which
both allow and constrain that freedom. Instead of being illimitably
free to make any decision, the judge improvises in relation to the law
that already exists and to the society and community (the audience)
for whom she or he is judging. Conceived this way, the creativity of
law becomes less suspect and allows for the possibility of ‘spontaneity’
that is just and desired. ‘Jamming’ the law requires, amongst other
things, ‘deep listening’29 (Oliveros 2005), that is, the ‘intense form of
commitment and responsibility to — as well as interaction with — all
that surrounds us: people, environments, nature, the sounds of daily
life’ (Fischlin and Heble 2004: 11). It demands attunement, not only to
the singularity of the situation, but also to the context and community
within which the judgment is made. By listening deeply to the personal
stories of others, we may begin to understand ‘our story as a community
of people and thus tap into the collective and universal experience’
(IPTN). Social action, in other words, makes ‘spontaneity’ possible,
which in turn enables social change and transformation as space is
made ‘for the stories of the community, through individual voices’,
and their effects on us (IPTN).

Law as Creative Group Performance
As with Playback Theatre, modern law plays back stories in the
courtroom with a view to translating individual experiences into a
form understandable by the collective (Fox 2003: 263). The uniqueness
of each story or case is made meaningful through its translation into
pre-existing rules of evidence, procedure, precedent and general legal
principles. The judge takes on the role of ‘nonscripted actor’ in this play,
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improvising on the story to make it comprehensible to the collective
(fellow judges, lawyers and other legal audiences). However, the
‘spontaneity’ of the judgment is not illimitable. Its singularity is only
meaningful when translated through the law already in existence. Thus,
improvisation in law is never completely unknown and unpredictable.

Recognising the importance of ‘spontaneity’ in judgment entails
a concurrent appreciation of the importance of ‘creative group
performance’ or ‘group creativity’ (Sawyer 2006: 3-4) in law. As a
‘living, practiced tradition’ (245), which is by nature collaborative and
creative, law insists on the ‘[i]mprovisational creativity’ (245) of both
the individual performer (judge) and the performance community or
audience. Law, like theatre, is an ‘ensemble art’ (Sawyer 2006: 252).
No one law, statute, or judge comprises the whole of ‘law’ and each
individual judgment is a product of ‘changing interactions’ (252) with
the collective. These changing interactions are, by their very designation,
at least somewhat unpredictable and improvised.
Read as improvisation, law becomes a ‘social practice’ that is
‘predicated on the exploration of alternative (and alterative) modes
of being in community’ (Fischlin and Heble 2004: 13), of being in
and with others in society. It is for this reason, and for the ‘hope and
possibility’ (11) that come from ‘envisionings of possibilities excluded
from conventional systems of thought’ (11), that ‘spontaneity’ in judgment
should be welcomed and encouraged. In its ‘resistance to orthodoxies’
(11), improvisation in law, as in theatre and music, has the potential to
produce new ways of knowing and being in the world. In unpacking the
law’s ‘lived reality of creativity’ (Sawyer 2006: 259) as that which is ‘almost
never a solitary activity’ (259), but is instead ‘fundamentally social and
collaborative’ (259), it is obvious that law, like Playback Theatre, has the
potential to ‘build communities that have been torn asunder’ (Fox 1986:
263) and to bring about positive and necessary change in contemporary
society. Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, its optimism, instead of
being feared, denied or discouraged, legal improvisation — as jamming
or creative group performance — should be embraced.
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Notes
1

2
3

4

5

6

7

Deepest gratitude is offered to the Editors of this Special Issue, Marett
Leiboff and Sophie Nield, for their support and assistance throughout the
process of writing this article, as well as the engagement and suggestions
of the participants at Law’s Theatrical Presence Workshop in London,
England on 5 December 2009, namely Patrícia Branco, Sophie Nield,
Theron Schmidt, Karen Walton and Graham White. I would also like
to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very constructive comments
on the original draft and, as always, thanks to Eugene McNamee for his
insightful feedback and discussion on the ideas offered herein.
With no script guiding the performance, ‘nonscripted’ actors utilise
improvisational acting techniques to stage stories extemporaneously.

The concept ‘modern law’ denotes the ‘traditional representation [of] the
discipline of law’ as ‘always, in the last instance, an enterprise in strict
reason or logic and human social behaviour’ and, correspondingly, ‘as
the consequence of reasoned intentions and explicitly formulated goals’
(Goodrich 1986: 545). For a critique of this vision of law in modernity,
see Goodrich (1986) and Fitzpatrick (1992).

In common law legal systems, a legal precedent or authority is a previous
legal case or decision, establishing a principle or rule, which a judge or
other judicial body may (and, at times, must) follow when deciding a
subsequent case with similar issues or facts. Precedent, as will be described
in further detail in Section 4, is founded on the principle that ‘like cases
will be treated alike, and that similarly situated individuals are subject to
the same legal consequences’ (Rehnquist 1986: 347).
Placing ‘spontaneity’ in quotation marks signifies a departure from the
dominant societal or dictionary definition of spontaneity as ‘involuntary,
not due to conscious volition’ (OERD 1996: 1400).

The Common Law, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is ‘a body of law
that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as distinguished from
legislative enactments’ (Black 1990: 276). In contrast, a Civil Law legal
system features laws that are written and collected or codified through
legislative enactments as opposed to judges (246).

In instances where a dispute is fundamentally distinct from all previous
cases, judges have the authority and duty to make new law. This is called
primae impressionis, a ‘case of a new kind, to which no established principle
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8

9

of law or precedent directly applies, and which must be decided entirely
by reason as distinguished from authority’ (Black 1990: 1189).

The word ‘improvisation’ is derived from the Latin improvisus, which
‘refers to the ‘unforeseen’ or that which occurs ‘on the spur of the moment”’
(Alterhaug 2004: 98).
Adversary system is defined by Black as ‘The jurisprudential network of
laws, rules and procedures characterized by opposing parties who contend
against each other for a result favorable to themselves. In such system, the
judge acts as an independent magistrate rather than prosecutor’ (Black
1990: 53).

10 Criminal or penal laws refer to all the statutes (federal and, in some
countries, state laws) that ‘def ine criminal offenses and specify
corresponding fines and punishment’ (Black 1990: 1133).
11 Civil law is a body of law that is concerned with ‘civil or private rights and
remedies, as contrasted with criminal law’ (Black 1990: 246).
12 Procedural law prescribes the manner in which rights and duties among
and for persons, natural or otherwise, may be exercised and enforced in a
court (Black 1990: 1203).
13 As distinguished from procedural law, substantive law fixes duties and
establishes rights and duties among and for persons, natural or otherwise
(Black 1990: 1203).
14 Judgment is given immediately after hearing the arguments while the
judge is still sitting in court.

15 Common law countries can trace their legal heritage to England as former
colonies of the British Empire. They include Australia, Cameroon, Canada,
Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the United States of America.
16 My deepest appreciation is offered to the anonymous reviewer who forced
me to consider these distinctions and their relationship to judgment.

17 Activist courts, Bork argues, ‘announce principles and reach decisions
not plausibly derived from the Constitution [and other pre-existing laws]’
(Bork 2003: 19). Such invention of law ‘from whole cloth’ (Baker 2002:
140) is seen to ‘rightfully undermine our confidence in courts’ (140) and
give judges licence ‘to do what they please’ (Kaufman 1980: 81).
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18 The audience plays a large role in both theatre and law. Unfortunately,
there is not space enough in this article to give this issue proper attention.

19 One example of this comes from my own experience. Several years ago, I
was cast as Katharina in a community theatre production of Shakespeare’s
Taming of the Shrew. In one rehearsal close to the opening of the production,
the Director, as a joke, asked me to throw a pie in the face of Gremio in
the final scene (Act 5, Scene 2) during Kate’s ‘Fie, fie!’ monologue. The
actor playing Gremio, who was probably the most experienced and talented
in the ensemble and had a great sense of humour and adventure, instead
of being amused by the surprise, reacted very angrily and stormed off the
stage. He explained later that it was not the pie in the face that angered
him, but the improvised divergence from the scripted and rehearsed
action, which wrenched him out of character and forced him to lose his
concentration and forget his next action.
20 This is taken from the International Playback Theatre Network (IPTN)
website: http://www.playbacknet.org. The IPTN was established in 1990
by Jonathan Fox, Jo Salas and Judy Swallow to ‘facilitate communication
between playback practitioners and guide the playback movement’ (Fox
and Dauber 1999: 12).

21 In Playback Theatre, according to its founders, ‘each person’s uniqueness is
honoured and affirmed while at the same time building and strengthening
our connections to each other as a community of people’ (IPTN).

22 To be explained later, in relation to Jacques Derrida’s writings on law and
justice, legal judgment is being conceived here as the aporetic relation
between singularity and generality, individuality and collectivity.

23 Much of this caveat is taken from the report of one anonymous reviewer.
I agree wholeheartedly with the statements and offer thanks for the
sentiments expressed therein.
24 Playback Theatre is now practised in at least 30 countries (Fox and Dauber
1999: 13).

25 For information on this new field of interdisciplinary research, see the
‘Improvisation, Community and Social Practice’ Research Project, funded
by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada
(SSHRC) Major Collaborative Research Initiative (MCRI). http://www.
improvcommunity.ca.
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26 A recent edition of the journal Critical Studies in Improvisation is dedicated
to the theme of ‘Law, Justice and Improvisation’. See Piper and Waterman
(2010).

27 ‘(Im)possibility’ is read through the Derridean concept of différance,
or the ‘formal play of differences’ (Derrida 2002b: 26), ‘of traces’ (26),
which ‘forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be
present in and of itself, referring only to itself ’ (26, emphasis in original).
Impossibility is, for Derrida, ‘not the opposite of the possible’ (Beardsworth
1996: 26, emphasis in original). Instead, it ‘supports’ (Derrida 2005: 91)
and ‘releases the possible’ (Beardsworth 1996: 26, emphasis in original).
Impossibility and failure, in other words, contain the trace or promise of
possibility. In its failure, possibility survives.

28 Reputations were both made and broken in these jam sessions. One of the
most celebrated ordeals was when drummer Jo Jones ‘threw his high-hat
cymbal on the floor of the Reno Club in Kansas City to make it clear to
a struggling teenaged Charlie Parker that he most emphatically did not
belong – yet’ (DeVeaux 1997: 214, emphasis in original). In response to
this humiliation, Parker went home and stayed there, practising, for three
months – until he knew what he was doing (227). Thus, for young musicians
still learning their craft, the ‘competitive give-and-take of “cutting”’
(Belgrad 1989: 180) was ‘as much a part of their training as practising
scales’ (DeVeaux 1997: 211).
29 According to the Deep Listening Institute’s website:

Deep Listening® is a philosophy and practice developed by Pauline
Oliveros that distinguishes the difference between the involuntary nature
of hearing and the voluntary selective nature of listening. The result of the
practice cultivates appreciation of sounds on a heightened level, expanding
the potential for connection and interaction with one’s environment,
technology and performance with others in music and related arts.
For more information, see http://www.deeplistening.org/site/about.
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